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High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock option-based compensation

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  • Andergassen, Rainer

Abstract

This paper examines the trade-off shareholders face between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We provide a solution to the optimal compensation problem, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 101 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 122-125

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:122-125

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: Executive compensation Executive stock options Restricted stock Fraud Incentives;

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References

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  1. Siew Hong Teoh & Ivo Welch & T.J. Wong, 1998. "Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(6), pages 1935-1974, December.
  2. Teoh, Siew Hong & Welch, Ivo & Wong, T. J., 1998. "Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 63-99, October.
  3. Bergstresser, Daniel & Philippon, Thomas, 2006. "CEO incentives and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 511-529, June.
  4. Burns, Natasha & Kedia, Simi, 2006. "The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 35-67, January.
  5. Michael C. Jensen, 2004. "The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(4), pages 549-565.
  6. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
  7. Kevin J. Murphy & Brian J. Hall, 2000. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 209-214, May.
  8. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Degeorge, Fran├žois & Patel, U & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1998. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," CEPR Discussion Papers 1790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Michael C. Jensen, 2003. "Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 9(3), pages 379-406.
  11. Konan Chan & Louis K. C. Chan & Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Josef Lakonishok, 2006. "Earnings Quality and Stock Returns," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1041-1082, May.
  12. Baruch Lev, 2003. "Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 27-50, Spring.
  13. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
  14. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June.
  15. Angelo Baglioni & Luca Colombo, 2009. "Managers' Compensation And Misreporting: A Costly State Verification Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 278-289, 04.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wu, Yan Wendy, 2011. "Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-644, October.
  2. Rudy Santore & Martin Tackie, 2013. "Stock option contract design and managerial fraud," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1283-1289.
  3. Cheng-Feng Cheng, 2012. "Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 11(1), pages 25-44, June.

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