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Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation

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Author Info

  • Cheng-Feng Cheng

    (Department of International Business, Asia University, Taiwan)

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    Abstract

    This study develops a conceptual model for compensation from firm and manager perspectives. We identify the negotiating range for a compensation plan and adopt a dynamic bargaining game to optimize the equilibrium of base salary and bonus.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 25-44

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    Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:25-44

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    Postal: 100 Wenhwa Road, Seatwen, Taichung
    Web page: http://www.ijbe.org/
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    Related research

    Keywords: game theory; optimization; compensation; negotiation; risk analysis;

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    References

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    1. Amiya K. Basu & Rajiv Lal & V. Srinivasan & Richard Staelin, 1985. "Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 267-291.
    2. Joshua S. Gans & Andrew Leigh, 2006. "Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients have any Power?," CEPR Discussion Papers 528, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    3. Andergassen, Rainer, 2008. "High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock option-based compensation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 122-125, November.
    4. Fershtman, C & Gneezy, U, 1996. "Strategic Delegation : An Experiment," Papers 43-96, Tel Aviv.
    5. Ke Yang, 2010. "Limit-Pricing and Learning-By-Doing: A Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 9(3), pages 201-212, December.
    6. Sanjog Misra & Harikesh Nair, 2011. "A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-257, September.
    7. Gwenlyn M. Busby & Heidi J. Albers & Claire A. Montgomery, 2012. "Wildfire Risk Management in a Landscape with Fragmented Ownership and Spatial Interactions," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(3), pages 496-517.
    8. Bizjak, John & Lemmon, Michael & Nguyen, Thanh, 2011. "Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 538-555, June.
    9. Ayşe Mumcu, 2010. "Strategic Withholding Of Firm-Specific Skills In Wage Bargaining," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 187-211, 05.
    10. Luigi Ermini & David F. Hendry, 2008. "Log Income vs. Linear Income: An Application of the Encompassing Principle," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 70(s1), pages 807-827, December.
    11. Giummo, Jesse, 2010. "German employee inventors' compensation records: A window into the returns to patented inventions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 969-984, September.
    12. Miller, Nolan H & Pazgal, Amit I, 2001. "The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 284-301, Summer.
    13. Salvatore Piccolo, 2009. "Colluding through Suppliers," CSEF Working Papers 224, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Apr 2010.
    14. Salvatore Piccolo & Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2012. "Colluding through suppliers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 492-513, 09.
    15. Crutchley, Claire E. & Minnick, Kristina, 2012. "Cash versus incentive compensation: Lawsuits and director pay," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(7), pages 907-913.
    16. Kissan Joseph & Alex Thevaranjan, 1998. "Monitoring and Incentives in Sales Organizations: An Agency-Theoretic Perspective," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(2), pages 107-123.
    17. Ni-Na Yan & Bao-Wen Sun, 2012. "Optimal Stackelberg Strategies For Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Third-Party Reverse Logistics," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 29(05), pages 1250026-1-1.
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