Evaluate the Effectiveness of Manager Compensation
AbstractThis study develops a conceptual model for compensation from firm and manager perspectives. We identify the negotiating range for a compensation plan and adopt a dynamic bargaining game to optimize the equilibrium of base salary and bonus.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
game theory; optimization; compensation; negotiation; risk analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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