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Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing

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  • Zou, Yuxiang
  • Chen, Tai-Liang

Abstract

Evidence reveals that there are more than 50% product innovation licensings applied within industries. We study product innovation licensing (quality-enhancing licensing) in both exclusive and non-exclusive schemes each under unit/revenue royalty and fixed fee in a vertically differentiated Cournot oligopoly, where a quality-leading firm is an internal licensor. We show that, under a non-exclusive licensing, royalty licensing is the superior policy for the licensor if quality difference within firms is small, regardless of whether a unit or revenue royalty scheme is offered. Under an exclusive licensing, a two-part tariff is optimal. If fixed fee licensing is practicable, the licensor favors an exclusive licensing. Furthermore, an increase in quality difference within firms increases the optimal rates. Using the simulated results, we examine that licensing improves social welfare in all schemes, and the number of licensees will influence the magnitude of welfare enhancement.

Suggested Citation

  • Zou, Yuxiang & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2020. "Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 372-382.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:87:y:2020:i:c:p:372-382
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2019.08.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Rong & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2021. "Does licensing improve welfare with rent dissipation?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    2. Yang, Le & Huang, Zining, 2023. "Quality-improving licensing of an outside innovator in a mixed Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    3. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2023. "Why some product innovations are licensed and others are not?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 152-158.
    4. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2022. "Product licensing in a Stackelberg industry," MPRA Paper 113985, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Cho, Sumi & Kim, Doori & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2022. "Free licensing strategy and ex-post privatization policy with passive ownership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    6. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2023. "Licensing a product innovation in a Cournot industry," MPRA Paper 116631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2023. "Licensing a product innovation from an external innovator to a Stackelberg duopoly," MPRA Paper 117542, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quality differentiation; Product innovation; Internal licensor; Exclusive/nonexclusive licensing; Unit/revenue royalty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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