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Technology transfer in duopoly The role of cost asymmetry

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  • Mukhopadhyay, Sankar
  • Kabiraj, Tarun
  • Mukherjee, Arijit

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  • Mukhopadhyay, Sankar & Kabiraj, Tarun & Mukherjee, Arijit, 1999. "Technology transfer in duopoly The role of cost asymmetry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 363-374, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:8:y:1999:i:4:p:363-374
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    1. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1983. "Consistent versus Non-Consistent Conjectures in Doupoly Theory: Some Examples," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 97-110, September.
    2. Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December.
    3. Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, 1985. "Licensing in the Theory of Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 237-252, Summer.
    4. Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-941, December.
    5. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter.
    6. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
    7. Katharine E. Rockett, 1990. "Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 161-171, Spring.
    8. Martin K. Perry, 1982. "Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 197-205, Spring.
    9. Reitman, David, 1994. "Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 313-322, September.
    10. Kabiraj, Tarun & Marjit, Sugata, 1993. "International technology transfer under potential threat of entry : A Cournot-Nash framework," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 75-88, October.
    11. Marjit, Sugata, 1990. "On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 293-298, July.
    12. Kwoka, John E, Jr, 1992. "The Output and Profit Effects of Horizontal Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 325-338, September.
    13. Bresnahan, Timothy F, 1981. "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 934-945, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arijit Mukherjee & Soma Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing and the Incentive for Innovation," Industrial Organization 0211008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 2015. "Patent Licensing with Bertrand Competitors," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(1), pages 1-16, January.
    3. Zou, Yuxiang & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2020. "Quality differentiation and product innovation licensing," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 372-382.
    4. Rajat Acharyya & Sugata Marjit, 2023. "Why trade when you can transfer the technology: Revisiting Smith and Ricardo," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1508-1527, September.
    5. Shuai Niu & Meiling Wang, 2022. "Partial acquisition and patent licensing in an asymmetric duopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(1), pages 92-105, January.
    6. Jianxia Yang & Chenhang Zeng, 2021. "Collusive stability of cross-holding with cost asymmetry," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(4), pages 549-566, November.
    7. Stefano Colombo & Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2021. "Equivalence between fixed fee and ad valorem profit royalty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1052-1073, October.
    8. Shuai Niu, 2014. "The Optimal Licensing Policy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(2), pages 202-217, March.
    9. Mariola Sánchez & José Antonio Belso‐Martínez & María José López‐Sánchez & Adrián Nerja, 2022. "Incentives to exclusive and non‐exclusive technology licensing under partial vertical integration," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(2), pages 171-189, March.
    10. Swapnendu Banerjee & Arijit Mukherjee & Sougata Poddar, 2023. "Optimal patent licensing—Two or three‐part tariff," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 624-648, June.
    11. Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 2016. "Revenue royalties," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 47-76, May.
    12. Niu, Shuai, 2013. "The equivalence of profit-sharing licensing and per-unit royalty licensing," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 10-14.
    13. Kabiraj, Tarun & Marjit, Sugata, 2003. "Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 113-124, February.
    14. Arijit Mukherjee, 2023. "Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 81-91, April.
    15. Hongkun Ma & Chenhang Zeng, 2022. "The effects of optimal cross holding in an asymmetric oligopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 1053-1066, October.
    16. Shuai Niu, 2017. "Profit-sharing licensing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 267-278, July.

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