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External balance, dynamic efficiency, and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies

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  • Bednar-Friedl, Birgit
  • Farmer, Karl

Abstract

This paper investigates domestic and foreign welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that the welfare effects of a more stringent cap on emissions depend on the external balance of the policy implementing country, the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy, and the preference for environmental quality. Under dynamic efficiency, the global welfare loss of policy implementation in a net foreign creditor country is lower than of a policy in the net foreign debtor country. Moreover, although the country which has unilaterally implemented a permit policy would gain from a multilateral policy, the associated welfare loss for the other country is larger than that of a unilateral policy abroad.

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  • Bednar-Friedl, Birgit & Farmer, Karl, 2010. "External balance, dynamic efficiency, and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 980-990, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:27:y:2010:i:5:p:980-990
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    1. Birgit Bednar-Friedl, 2012. "Climate policy targets in emerging and industrialized economies: the influence of technological differences, environmental preferences and propensity to save," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 191-215, May.

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