IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v124y2023ics0264999323001360.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Universally strong IPR protection and global welfare: A market-penetration perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
  • Tsai, Yingyi

Abstract

In a segmented trading environment with possible foreign penetration, we study market competition involving investment with cross-border differences in intellectual property rights (IPR) policy. While acknowledging that strong IPR promotes investment and facilitates the coverage in foreign markets where demand is much greater than that in the home market, we investigate a negative trade-off between the reduction in domestic welfare owing to business-stealing effect (BSE) and the increase in national welfare emerging from market-penetration effect (MPE), given host IPR policies. We show a partially (non-universally) strong IPR regime can nonetheless increase global welfare even when the MPE does not universally outweigh the BSE. This finding contrasts the arguments that strong IPR protection can improve welfare by reducing inequality in the long run and by increasing the effectiveness of knowledge spillovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Tsai, Yingyi, 2023. "Universally strong IPR protection and global welfare: A market-penetration perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:124:y:2023:i:c:s0264999323001360
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106324
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323001360
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106324?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ioannis Bournakis & Dimitris Christopoulos & Sushanta Mallick, 2018. "Knowledge Spillovers And Output Per Worker: An Industry‐Level Analysis For Oecd Countries," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1028-1046, April.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Biancini, Sara & Paillacar, Rodrigo, 2019. "Universal intellectual property rights: Too much of a good thing?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 51-81.
    3. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
    4. Dermot Leahy & Alireza Naghavi, 2010. "Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI versus Joint Ventures," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 633-649, September.
    5. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2013. "Foreign competition and social efficiency of entry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 108-112.
    6. Huw Edwards & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2013. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 750-764, September.
    7. Sajal Lahiri & Yingyi Tsai, 2019. "Foreign penetration and domestic competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 27-45, September.
    8. Kitagawa, Tatsuya & Masuda, Yasushi & Umezawa, Masashi, 2014. "Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 227-231.
    9. Song, Xueyin & Huang, Xianhai & Qing, Tao, 2021. "Intellectual property rights protection and quality upgrading: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    10. Kwon, Chul-Woo & Chun, Bong Geul, 2015. "The effect of strategic technology adoptions by local firms on technology spillover," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 13-20.
    11. Han Tien-Der & Haque M. Emranul & Mukherjee Arijit, 2022. "Social Efficiency of Entry in an Open Economy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 203-219, January.
    12. Angus C. Chu & Yuichi Furukawa & Sushanta Mallick & Pietro Peretto & Xilin Wang, 2021. "Dynamic effects of patent policy on innovation and inequality in a Schumpeterian economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1429-1465, June.
    13. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    14. Alireza Naghavi & Yingyi Tsai, 2015. "Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(2), pages 211-226, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alireza Naghavi & Yingyi Tsai, 2015. "Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(2), pages 211-226, May.
    2. Morita, Hodaka & Nguyen, Xuan, 2021. "FDI and quality-enhancing technology spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Nobuhiro Mori & Makoto Okamura & Takao Ohkawa, 2020. "Economic Regulation in the Consumer Loans Market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 447-459, December.
    4. Goerke, Laszlo, 2020. "A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    5. de Pinto Marco & Goerke Laszlo, 2019. "Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(4), pages 1-13, October.
    6. Marco de Pinto & Laszlo Goerke, 2020. "Welfare‐enhancing Trade Unions in an Oligopoly with Excessive Entry," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(1), pages 60-90, January.
    7. Tsai, Yingyi & Mukherjee, Arijit & Chen, Jong-Rong, 2016. "Host market competition, foreign FDI and domestic welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 13-22.
    8. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Endogenous Market Structure and Partisan Competition Authorities," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202201, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    9. Han, Junhee & Lee, Keun, 2022. "Heterogeneous technology and specialization for economic growth beyond the middle-income stage," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    10. Mills, David E. & Smith, William, 1996. "It pays to be different: Endogenous heterogeneity of firms in an oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 317-329, May.
    11. Song, Xueyin & Huang, Xianhai & Qing, Tao, 2021. "Intellectual property rights protection and quality upgrading: Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    12. Laszlo Goerke, 2022. "Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 238-270, July.
    13. Tian Wu & Bohan Zeng & Yali He & Xin Tian & Xunmin Ou, 2017. "Sustainable Governance for the Opened Electric Vehicle Charging and Upgraded Facilities Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-22, November.
    14. Wang, Leonard F.S., 2016. "Do industrial and trade policy lead to excess entry and social inefficiency?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 354-362.
    15. Leonard Wang & Angela Chao & Jen-yao Lee, 2015. "R&D and Social Inefficiency of Entry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 181-187, June.
    16. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Lee, Jen-yao & Hsu, Chu-chuan, 2014. "Privatization, foreign competition, and social efficiency of free entry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 138-147.
    17. Marco de Pinto & Lazlo Goerke & Alberto Palermo, 2023. "Informational Rents and the Excessive Entry Theorem: The Case of Hidden Action," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202301, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    18. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    19. Duan, Yunlong & Liu, Shuling & Cheng, Hao & Chin, Tachia & Luo, Xuan, 2021. "The moderating effect of absorptive capacity on transnational knowledge spillover and the innovation quality of high-tech industries in host countries: Evidence from the Chinese manufacturing industry," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    20. Zhiqi Chen & Bo Zhao, 2014. "Unemployment and product market competition in a Cournot model with efficiency wages," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(2), pages 555-579, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    IPRs; Segmented markets; Market penetration; Business stealing; Investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • P4 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:124:y:2023:i:c:s0264999323001360. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.