The totality of change-in-control payments
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.07.001
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More about this item
Keywords
Golden parachute; Change-in-control; Accelerated vesting; Executive compensation; Acquisitions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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