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On the Importance of Golden Parachutes

Author

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  • Fich, Eliezer M.
  • Tran, Anh L.
  • Walkling, Ralph A.

Abstract

In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from the deal could be offset by the loss of the future compensation stream associated with their jobs. Larger, more important parachutes provide greater relief for these losses. To explicitly measure the moral hazard target CEOs face, we standardize the parachute payment by the expected value of their acquisition-induced lost compensation. We examine 851 acquisitions from 1999–2007, finding that more important parachutes benefit target shareholders through higher completion probabilities. Conversely, as parachute importance increases, target shareholders receive lower takeover premia, while acquirer shareholders capture additional rents from target shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Fich, Eliezer M. & Tran, Anh L. & Walkling, Ralph A., 2013. "On the Importance of Golden Parachutes," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(6), pages 1717-1753, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:06:p:1717-1753_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2015. "CEO Preferences and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2813-2852, December.
    2. Brown, Kareen & Jha, Ranjini & Pacharn, Parunchana, 2015. "Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-126.
    3. Wen Shi & Xiaogang Bi, 2023. "Buddhism and M&A performance: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 4505-4531, December.
    4. Bebchuk, Lucian & Cohen, Alma & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2014. "Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 140-154.
    5. Dey, Aiyesha & White, Joshua T., 2021. "Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    6. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
    7. Bi, XiaoGang, 2021. "The Communist Party Committee and corporate takeovers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    8. Wen Shi & Xiaogang Bi & Agyenim Boateng & Shuai Yuan, 2023. "Chairperson (CEO) facial structure and risky investments: evidence from Chinese acquisitions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1177-1205, November.
    9. Maskara, Pankaj K. & Miller, Laura S., 2018. "Do golden parachutes matter? Evidence from firms that ultimately filed for bankruptcy," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 63-78.
    10. Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga Q., 2016. "Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 445-465.
    11. Offenberg, David & Officer, Micah S., 2014. "The totality of change-in-control payments," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 75-87.
    12. P. Raghavendra Rau & Jin Xu, 2013. "How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 631-671, June.
    13. Franck Missonier‐Piera & Cédric Spadetti, 2023. "The consequences of earnings management for the acquisition premium in friendly takeovers," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1-2), pages 308-334, January.
    14. Hong Zhu & Qi Zhu, 2016. "Mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms: A review and comparison with other mergers and acquisitions research in the leading journals," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 1107-1149, December.

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