Are stronger executive incentives associated with cross-listing? Evidence from China
AbstractThis study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal China Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 21 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chieco
Cross-listing Executive compensation Corporate governance;
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