IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chieco/v21y2010i1p150-160.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are stronger executive incentives associated with cross-listing? Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Chi, Wei
  • Zhang, Haiyan

Abstract

This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.

Suggested Citation

  • Chi, Wei & Zhang, Haiyan, 2010. "Are stronger executive incentives associated with cross-listing? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 150-160, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:21:y:2010:i:1:p:150-160
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043-951X(09)00157-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-238, February.
    2. Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, 2006. "International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 485-531, June.
    3. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    4. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Jun & Qian, Meijun, 2005. "Law, finance, and economic growth in China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 57-116, July.
    5. Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2006. "Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 693-714, September.
    6. Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 510-546, June.
    7. Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2009. "Ownership, performance and executive turnover in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 465-478, September.
    8. Lang, Mark & Smith Raedy, Jana & Wilson, Wendy, 2006. "Earnings management and cross listing: Are reconciled earnings comparable to US earnings?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 255-283, October.
    9. Mark H. Lang & Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, 2003. "ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 317-345, May.
    10. Doidge, Craig, 2004. "U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 519-553, June.
    11. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
    12. Chi, Wei & Wang, Yijiang, 2007. "Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover," MPRA Paper 15302, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2009.
    13. Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Siegel, Jordan, 2005. "Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 319-359, February.
    15. DeFond, Mark L. & Wong, T. J. & Li, Shuhua, 1999. "The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 269-305, December.
    16. Wang, Qian & Wong, T.J. & Xia, Lijun, 2008. "State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 112-134, September.
    17. Stoyan Tenev & Chunlin Zhang & Loup Brefort, 2002. "Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China : Building the Institutions of Modern Markets," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15237, December.
    18. Michael Firth & Peter M. Y. Fung & Oliver M. Rui, 2006. "Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(6), pages 1289-1330, September.
    19. Reese, William Jr. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2002. "Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 65-104, October.
    20. Aivazian, Varouj A. & Ge, Ying & Qiu, Jiaping, 2005. "Corporate governance and manager turnover: An unusual social experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1459-1481, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Hongmei, 2015. "Corporate governance, state ownership and cross-listing: Evidence from Chinese A-share listed firms," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 2/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    2. Xuegang Cui & Lei Xu & Huili Zhang & Yuxiao Zhang, 2021. "Executive compensation and firm performance: Evidence from cross‐listed AH‐share firms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 88-102, January.
    3. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2011. "Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms: New evidence," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-10, March.
    4. Zijian Cheng & Charles P. Cullinan & Zhangxin (Frank) Liu & Junrui Zhang, 2021. "Cross‐listings and dividend size and stability: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 415-465, March.
    5. Teng Lin & Marion Hutchinson & Majella Percy, 2015. "Earnings management and the role of the audit committee: an investigation of the influence of cross-listing and government officials on the audit committee," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 197-227, February.
    6. Lam, Kevin C.K. & McGuinness, Paul B. & Vieito, João Paulo, 2013. "CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese‐listed enterprises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1136-1159.
    7. Tina He & Wilson Li & Gordon Tang, 2012. "Dividends Behavior in State- Versus Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 97-112, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chi, Wei & Zhang, Haiyan, 2008. "Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China," MPRA Paper 11649, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Xuegang Cui & Lei Xu & Huili Zhang & Yuxiao Zhang, 2021. "Executive compensation and firm performance: Evidence from cross‐listed AH‐share firms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 88-102, January.
    3. Arslan-Ayaydin, Özgür & Chen, Shimin & Ni, Serene Xu & Thewissen, James, 2022. "Is cross-listing a panacea for improving earnings quality? The case of H- and B-share firms in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    4. Sarkissian, Sergei & Schill, Michael J., 2012. "The nature of the foreign listing premium: A cross-country examination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 2494-2511.
    5. Smirnova, Elena, 2008. "Depositary receipts and firm value: Evidence from Central Europe and Russia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 266-279, December.
    6. Hail, Luzi & Leuz, Christian, 2009. "Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S. cross-listings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 428-454, September.
    7. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, 2016. "The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 525-622, May.
    8. Xunan Feng & Anders C. Johansson, 2017. "CEO Incentives in Chinese State-Controlled Firms," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 223-264.
    9. Hope, Ole-Kristian & Kang, Tony & Kim, Joung W., 2013. "Voluntary disclosure practices by foreign firms cross-listed in the United States," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 50-66.
    10. Imen Ghadhab, 2021. "Cross-listing and crisis," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(7), pages 539-558, December.
    11. John Ammer & Sara B. Holland & David C. Smith & Francis E. Warnock, 2008. "Why do U.S. cross-listings matter?," International Finance Discussion Papers 930, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Ugur Lel & Darius P. Miller, 2008. "International Cross‐Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1897-1937, August.
    13. John Ammer & Sara B. Holland & David C. Smith & Francis E. Warnock, 2006. "Look at Me Now: What Attracts U.S. Shareholders?," NBER Working Papers 12500, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Del Bosco, Barbara & Misani, Nicola, 2016. "The effect of cross-listing on the environmental, social, and governance performance of firms," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 977-990.
    15. Leuz, Christian, 2006. "Cross listing, bonding and firms' reporting incentives: A discussion of Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006)," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 285-299, October.
    16. Charest, Guy & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Marhfor, Ahmed & M’Zali, Bouchra, 2013. "US cross-listing and corporate disclosure policy," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-112.
    17. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:432-449 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Conyon, Martin J. & He, Lerong, 2011. "Executive compensation and corporate governance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1158-1175, September.
    19. Jiandong Chen & Douglas Cumming & Wenxuan Hou & Edward Lee, 2016. "CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 138(4), pages 787-806, November.
    20. Hu, Fang & Pan, Xiaofei & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 235-255.
    21. Doidge, Craig & Andrew Karolyi, G. & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-39, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:21:y:2010:i:1:p:150-160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/chieco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.