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Ownership, Performance and Executive Turnover

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Author Info
Chi, Wei
Wang, Yijiang

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Abstract

To more thoroughly study the effect of ownership on management turnover, firms are classified by ownership simultaneously along two dimensions: types of owners and concentration of ownership. Under this new framework, a unique data set is used to study the sensitivity of management turnover to a company’s performance. The study confirms some of the results from previous studies. It also obtained interesting and important new results. It finds evidence that the sensitivity of management turnover to performance is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but in opposite directions under state and private ownership. It also provides evidence allowing us to rank firms in different categories of ownership by their sensitivity of management turnover to performance: Concentrated private ownership has the highest sensitivity, concentrated state ownership the lowest, and the two categories of dispersed ownership, one with a private investor and the other with the state as the largest shareholder, in between. Important policy implications of these findings are discussed.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3545.

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Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3545

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Related research
Keywords: state ownership; ownership concentration; performance; executive turnover;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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