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The pattern of investment surrounding CEO retirements: UK evidence

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  • Conyon, Martin J.
  • Florou, Annita

Abstract

The recent spate of corporate scandals worldwide has again raised serious concerns about the quality of corporate governance. We examine the governance effects on investment expenditure in the year of CEO retirement. Based on a sample of the 460 largest UK listed companies during 1990–1998, we find no evidence of changes in capital or research and development expenditure when CEOs are on the verge of retiring. In addition, neither board size nor leadership structure (separating the posts of CEO and chairman) influence corporate investment during the CEO's final year. However, we do show that there are some important governance effects. Cutbacks in fixed asset spending at the time of CEO departure are less likely in firms with executive-dominated boards. There is evidence that stock ownership of outside directors is associated with increased capital expenditure when the CEO retires. Finally, further analysis suggests that insider board monitoring and outsider equity ownership may act as substitute mechanisms in ensuring that retiring CEOs focus on value creating activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Conyon, Martin J. & Florou, Annita, 2006. "The pattern of investment surrounding CEO retirements: UK evidence," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 299-319.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:38:y:2006:i:3:p:299-319
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2006.04.007
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    Cited by:

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    2. Carlos Jiménez-Angueira & Nathan Stuart, 2015. "Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 701-732, May.
    3. Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2009. "Earnings management surrounding CEO changes in France [La gestion du résultat comptable autour d'un changement de dirigeant en France]," Post-Print hal-02156582, HAL.
    4. Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2008. "Les stratégies comptables entourant un changement de dirigeant en France," Post-Print halshs-00525427, HAL.
    5. Dedman, Elisabeth, 2016. "CEO succession in the UK: An analysis of the effect of censuring the CEO-to-chair move in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 359-378.
    6. Annita Florou & Peter Pope, 2008. "Are boards and institutional investors active monitors? Evidence from CEO dismissal," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 23(9), pages 862-872, October.
    7. Jingoo Kang, 2016. "Labor market evaluation versus legacy conservation: What factors determine retiring CEOs' decisions about long-term investment?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 389-405, February.
    8. Cazier, Richard A., 2011. "Measuring R&D curtailment among short-horizon CEOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 584-594, June.
    9. Kabir, Rezaul & Li, Hao & Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia, 2018. "Do managers act opportunistically towards the end of their career?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 218-232.
    10. Yves Mard & Sylvain Marsat, 2008. "Les stratégies comptables précédant un changement de dirigeant en France," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(4), pages 111-136, December.

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