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Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms

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  • David Hillier
  • Patrick McColgan

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the family status of a company's top officer affects managerial replacement decisions. We report evidence that family‐managed companies are characterized by higher levels of board control and potentially weak internal governance systems. Family CEOs are less likely than non‐family CEOs to depart their position following poor performance. Stock prices react favorably and operating performance improves when companies announce the departure of a family CEO. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholders benefit when a powerful CEO leaves their position in the company.

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  • David Hillier & Patrick McColgan, 2009. "Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 461-484, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:36:y:2009:i:3-4:p:461-484
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02138.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Lozano, M. Belén & Martínez, Beatriz & Pindado, Julio, 2016. "Corporate governance, ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1333-1343.
    2. Marshall, Andrew & McCann, Laura & McColgan, Patrick, 2014. "Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 118-131.
    3. Jan-Philipp Ahrens & Andrea Calabrò & Jolien Huybrechts & Michael Woywode, 2019. "The Enigma of the Family Successor–Firm Performance Relationship: A Methodological Reflection and Reconciliation Attempt," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 43(3), pages 437-474, May.
    4. Alice Medioli & Pier Luigi Marchini & Tatiana Mazza, 2024. "The impact of corruption and public governance quality on family firm business strategy," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(1), pages 55-69, January.
    5. Tomasz Ingram & Katarzyna Bratnicka-Mysliwiec, 2021. "Organizational Resilience and Family Firm Performance: The Role of Socioemotional Wealth," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 523-540.
    6. Paul André, 2009. "Discussion of Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 485-495, April.
    7. Henning Behr & Kerstin Fehre, 2019. "CEO succession and the CEO’s commitment to the status quo," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 12(2), pages 355-381, December.
    8. Xiaoxiang Zhang & Jo-Ting Wei & Hsin-Hung Wu, 2013. "Forced financial information restatements and management turnover: Market discipline and large family shareholders’ intervention in an emerging economy," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 1005-1029, December.
    9. Martin R.W. Hiebl & Zhen Li, 2020. "Non-family managers in family firms: review, integrative framework and future research agenda," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 763-807, August.
    10. Kosmidou, Vasiliki & Holt, Daniel T., 2022. "The relationship between family management and performance: A configurational approach in exploring the role of socioemotional wealth and generational stage," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4).
    11. Christian Brück & Jonas Ludwig & Anja Schwering, 2018. "The use of value-based management in family firms," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 383-416, February.
    12. Angelica Gonzalez & Paul André, 2014. "Board Effectiveness and Short Termism," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1-2), pages 185-209, January.
    13. Christophe J. Godlewski & Hong Nhung Le, 2024. "Family ties and firm performance empirical evidence from East Asia," Post-Print hal-04435944, HAL.
    14. Xia Chen & Qiang Cheng & Zhonglan Dai, 2013. "Family Ownership and CEO Turnovers," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1166-1190, September.
    15. Paul André, 2009. "Discussion of Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 485-495, April.
    16. D’Angelo, Valentino & Amore, Mario Daniele & Minichilli, Alessandro & Chen, Kelly Xing & Solarino, Angelo Maria, 2023. "Family agents," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2).
    17. Chih-Yang Tseng, 2020. "Family firms and long-term orientation of SG&A expenditures," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1181-1206, November.
    18. Ansari, Iram Fatima & Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2014. "The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 6-25.
    19. Pinheiro, Roberto & Yung, Chris, 2015. "CEOs in family firms: Does junior know what he's doing?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 345-361.
    20. Waldkirch, Matthias, 2020. "Non-family CEOs in family firms: Spotting gaps and challenging assumptions for a future research agenda," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1).
    21. Julio Pindado & Ignacio Requejo & Chabela la Torre, 2015. "Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7-8), pages 965-1006, September.
    22. Wennberg, Karl & Wiklund, Johan & Hellerstedt, Karin & Nordqvist, Mattias, 2011. "Implications of Intra-Family and External Ownership Transfer Of Family Firms: Short Term and Long Term Performance," Ratio Working Papers 172, The Ratio Institute.
    23. Schlepphorst, Susanne & Moog, Petra, 2014. "Left in the dark: Family successors’ requirement profiles in the family business succession process," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 358-371.

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