Severance agreements, incentives and CEO dismissal
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Yermack, David, 2006.
"Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 237-256, September.
- Yermack, David, 2006. "Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs," SIFR Research Report Series 41, Institute for Financial Research.
- Brian Bell & John Reenen, 2014.
"Bankers and Their Bonuses,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(574), pages 1-21, February.
- Brian Bell & John Van Reenen, 2013. "Bankers and their bonuses," CEP Occasional Papers 35, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Bell, Brian & Van Reenen, John, 2014. "Bankers and their bonuses," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56057, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2010.
"CEO Replacement Under Private Information,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 2935-2969, August.
- Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger, 2009. "CEO replacement under private information," IMFS Working Paper Series 29, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, 2003. "Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 519-548, April.
- Michael Faulkender & Dalida Kadyrzhanova & N. Prabhala & Lemma Senbet, 2010. "Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 107-118, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010.
"CEO Compensation,"
Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
- Frydman, Carola & Jenter, Dirk, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Research Papers 2069, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," NBER Working Papers 16585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3277, CESifo.
- Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013.
"CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
- Henrik CRONQVIST & Rüdiger FAHLENBRACH, 2011. "CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 11-14, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.
- Van Wesep, Edward D. & Wang, Sean, 2014. "The prevention of excess managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 579-593.
- Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2018.
"Managerial turnover and entrenchment,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 742-771, October.
- Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2015. "Managerial Turnover and Entrenchment," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Brown, Kareen & Jha, Ranjini & Pacharn, Parunchana, 2015. "Ex ante CEO severance pay and risk-taking in the financial services sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 111-126.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2019.
"Paid to Quit,"
De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 387-406, December.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2013. "Paid to Quit," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-174/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Dec 2015.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2015. "Paid to Quit," CESifo Working Paper Series 5648, CESifo.
- Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012.
"Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
43144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Anderson, Ronald & Guibaud, Stéphane & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 9147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ronald W. Anderson & M. Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," FMG Discussion Papers dp711, Financial Markets Group.
- Eckbo, B. Espen & Thorburn, Karin S. & Wang, Wei, 2016.
"How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 210-229.
- Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S & Wang, Wei, 2015. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart & Laux, Volker, 2017. "Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 253-261.
- Cyrus Aghamolla & Tadashi Hashimoto, 2021. "Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 437-486, May.
- Van Dalsem, Shane, 2010. "Determinants of CEO severance contracts and their components and the effects of severance contracts on executive turnover," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 257-272, July.
- Meg Adachi‐Sato, 2018. "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 275-313, February.
- Swarnodeep HomRoy, 2016. "Was Adam Smith Right? Evidence of Compensating Differential in CEO Pay," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022. "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series 9801, CESifo.
- P. Raghavendra Rau & Jin Xu, 2013. "How Do Ex Ante Severance Pay Contracts Fit into Optimal Executive Incentive Schemes?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 631-671, June.
- Meg Adachi-Sato, 2010. "Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-710, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Isaka, Naoto, 2017. "When are uninformed boards preferable?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA), pages 191-211.
More about this item
Keywords
managerial compensation; severance pay; firing policy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00636. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.