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Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?

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  • Ismail Saglam

    ()
    (Bogazici University)

  • Semih Koray

    ()
    (Bilkent University)

Abstract

We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume3/EB-07C70006A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 12 ()
Pages: 1-10

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70006

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  1. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  2. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  3. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  4. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
  5. Semih Koray & Ismail Saglam, 2005. "The Need for Regulating a Bayesian Regulator," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, 07.
  6. Koray, Semih & Sertel, Murat R., 1990. "Pretend-but-perform regulation and limit pricing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 451-472.
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