Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example
AbstractWe study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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