Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Roberto Serrano
• Sandeep Baliga

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Publisher Info

Paper provided by Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals in its series Papers with number 193.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:193

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK, INFORMATION AND QUANTITY SIGNALS IN ECONOMICS(E.S.R.C.), DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ECONOMICS, SIDGWICK AV. CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DEDE U.K..
Phone: +44 1223 335200
Fax: +44 1223 335475
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/
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Related research

Keywords: information ; game theory;

Other versions of this item:

• Article
  • Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto, 1995. "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 578-589, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.