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Multiplicity of Equilibrium Payoffs in Three-Player Baron-Ferejohn Model

Author

Listed:
  • Duozhe Li

    (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

This paper studies the three-player sequential bargaining game with a simple majority voting rule due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We show that there is a vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, and that as the discount factor tends to one, the set of equilibrium payoffs evolves monotonically towards the entire feasible set. The multiplicity result can be easily extended to an interesting variant of the bargaining game, in which the responders only observe their own offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Duozhe Li, 2014. "Multiplicity of Equilibrium Payoffs in Three-Player Baron-Ferejohn Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1122-1132.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-13-00779
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2014/Volume34/EB-14-V34-I2-P104.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018. "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 101-112.
    2. Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto, 1995. "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 578-589, December.
    3. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
    4. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    5. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018. "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 101-112.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multilateral Bargaining; Majority Voting; Multiple Equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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