Agresser un concurrent pour le sortir du marché:une étude de cas
Abstract(VF)Cette recherche a pour objectif de s'interroger sur les liens entre l'agressivité concurrentielle et la sortie de marché. Par l'étude approfondie d'un cas, elle montre comment deux firmes ont délibérément éliminé du marché leurs deux principaux concurrents pour se retrouver en si-tuation de duopole et, ainsi, contrôler l'évolution des prix pour accroître leurs performances. Elle montre également les processus d'interdépendance qui rendent instables les triopoles ou quadriopoles, relativement aux possibilités d'entente stable et profitable dans les duopoles.(VA)This research aims to wonder about the bonds between competing aggressiveness and the exit of market. By the thorough study of a case, it shows how two firms deliberately eliminated from the market their two principal competitors to find themselves in situation of duopoly and, thus, to control the trend of prices to increase their performances. It also shows the processes of interdependence which make unstable the triopolies or quadriopolies, relative to the possibilities of stable and advantageous agreement in the duopolies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.
Volume (Year): 6 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Burns, Malcolm R, 1986. "Predatory Pricing and Acquisition Cost of Competitors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 266-96, April.
- Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596 Elsevier.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
- Vázquez-Maguirre, Mario & Hartmann, Andreas M., 2013. "Nonmarket strategies of media enterprises in the Mexican television industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1743-1749.
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