Consumers Win-back as Exclusionary Conduct. Some Insights for Antitrust Law
AbstractIncumbents' winback actions recently received a growing antitrust scrutiny in network industries. These actions refer to incumbents’ strategies aimed at regaining, through targeted marketing and selective discounts, former customers who switched to a new entrant. We analyze the impact of winback actions on competition and discuss pros and cons of a temporarily ban on incumbent's side, through the so-called 'winback rules'.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 565.
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Entry Deterrence; Exit Inducement; Exclusionary Strategies; Winback; Blockaded Expansion; Holed Bucket Effect;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
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