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Consumers Win-back as Exclusionary Conduct. Some Insights for Antitrust Law

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  • Antonio Nicita

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    Abstract

    Incumbents' winback actions recently received a growing antitrust scrutiny in network industries. These actions refer to incumbents’ strategies aimed at regaining, through targeted marketing and selective discounts, former customers who switched to a new entrant. We analyze the impact of winback actions on competition and discuss pros and cons of a temporarily ban on incumbent's side, through the so-called 'winback rules'.

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    File URL: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/quaderni/565.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 565.

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    Date of creation: Aug 2009
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    Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:565

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    Related research

    Keywords: Entry Deterrence; Exit Inducement; Exclusionary Strategies; Winback; Blockaded Expansion; Holed Bucket Effect;

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    1. Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596 Elsevier.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    3. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
    4. Armstrong, M. & Vickers, J., 1992. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Economics Series Working Papers 99140, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December.
    6. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March.
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