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DÉBAT-Autorité de gestion et avaries communes:une note de lecture

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  • Michel Albouy

    ()
    (Université Pierre Mendès France Grenoble)

Abstract

(VF) Comment expliquer que la gouvernance reste dominée davantage par une approche actionnariale que partenariale ? Cette note propose une lecture critique de l’article de Segrestin et Hatchuel publié dans Finance- Contrôle-Stratégie (vol. 14, n° 2, juin 2011) sur l’autorité de gestion et les avaries communes. Il s’agit d’une part d’essayer de répondre à la question que se posent les auteurs et, d’autre part, de questionner leurs propositions, qui remettent forte- ment en question le pouvoir des actionnaires dans l’entreprise. (VA)How to explain the prevalence of shareholder-centered approaches to corporate governance despite their critics? This note proposes a critical reading of the article published by Segrestin and Hatchuel in Finance-Contrôle- Stratégie (vol. 14, n° 2, June 2011) on managerial authority and general averages. We try to answer the question addressed by the authors and to question their propositions, which tend to reduce the power of stockholders in corporations.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 7-19

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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:7-19.

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Keywords: actionnaires; management; gouvernance; entreprise; shareholders; management; governance; firms.;

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  1. Batsch, Laurent, 2002. "Le capitalisme financier," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1742, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
  3. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
  4. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
  5. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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