(VF)Cet article vise à étudier le lien entre la structure de rémunération des dirigeants des entreprises de haute technologie et leur capacité à encourager les activités d'innovation. Il souligne les limites des contrats de rémunération habituels (bonus comptable, actions et stock-options) quant à la promotion de l'innovation, et propose de lier la rémunération du dirigeant de façon explicite à des mesures opérationnelles des activités d'innovation.(VA)The purpose of this study is to investigate into the link between the structure of CEO compensation in high technology firms and innovation activities. It stresses the weakness of traditional compensation contracts based on accounting and financial indicators in relation to innovation activities, and proposes to tie CEO compensation more explicitly to operational measures of innovation activities.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2008) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 65-85 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2008:i:q4:p:65-85
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Find related papers by JEL classification: M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects