Définition des bonus des dirigeants et performance des entreprises de haute technologie
Abstract(VF)Cet article étudie les différences de performance consécutives à l’introduction de trois types de bonus proposés aux dirigeants d’entreprises de haute technologie : ceux liés aux seuls critères financiers, ceux incorporant en plus des critères non financiers hors R&D et ceux incluant des critères non financiers dont la R&D. Les résultats obtenus sur un échantillon de 230 entreprises suggèrent que l’introduction de mesures de R&D dans les bonus est le choix le plus pertinent. De plus, il n’apparaît pas de différence de performance entre un bonus financier et un bonus introduisant des indicateurs non financiers excluant la R&D.(VA)This article investigates the performance impact of introducing three different types of CEO bonuses into high technology firms : bonus based on financial measures, bonuses based on financial and non financial measures excluding R&D and bonuses based on financial and non financial measures including R&D. The results, drawn from a sample of 230 firms, suggest that firms whose CEO bonus incorporates R&D measures perform better than firms which rely on other types of financial and non financial measures in defining the CEO bonus.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.
Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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