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Misuse of Institutions: Patterns and Causes

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  • Leonid POLISHCHUK

    ()
    (The University of Maryland, USA and State University-Higher School of Economics, Russia)

Abstract

Institutions are often misused, i.e. applied or resorted to for reasons which have little in common with their intended raison d'etre. This paper provides an insight into the origins and causes of institutional misuse and explores the political economy of this phenomenon. We present a typology of misuse of institutions and illustrate it by examples largely drawn from Russian realities. Causes of vulnerability of institution to misuse are discussed. It is argued that institutions are not protected from misuse at the grassroots due to unresolved collective action problem, whereas economic and political elite are either indifferent to misuse of institutions, or perpetrate such misuse by subverting market institutions for the purpose of rent extraction.

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File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~ces/jces/04_jces_2008/06_Polishuchik.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The Japanese Society for Comparative Economic Studies (JSCES) in its journal The Journal of Comparative Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): (December)
Pages: 57-80

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Handle: RePEc:cos:epaper:v:4:y:2008:p:57-80

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Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~ces/
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Related research

Keywords: institutions; political economy; legal reform; institutional capture;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. L. Polishchuk & E. Borisova & A. Peresetsky., 2010. "Managing Common Property in Russian Cities: An Economic Analysis of Homeowners Associations," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
  2. Leonid Polishchuk & Georgiy Syunyaev, 2013. "Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights," HSE Working papers WP BRP 43/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  3. Dimiter Ialnazov & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2010. "The evolution of post-communist countries: An interpretation from the perspective of cooperation," ICER Working Papers 03-2010, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  4. Leonid Polishchuk & Alexander Tonis, 2013. "Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 271-297, January.
  5. Dimiter Ialnazov & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2011. "A Game Theory Interpretation of the Post-Communist Evolution," Journal of Economic Issues, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 45(1), pages 41-56, March.

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