IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/col/000152/020722.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Political Economy of Trade Barriers in Peru

Author

Listed:
  • Mario Tello Pacheco

Abstract

This paper analyzes the political economy factors and actors that may have influenced trade instruments in Peru during the liberalization period of 2001-2015 (which started in 1990 under Fujimori’s administration). The evidence supports the hypothesis that Peruvian trade barriers liberalization in period 2000-2015 was led by the powerful “Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)”, accompanied by traditional and diversified exporters (that consolidated the unilateral trade liberalization) and by import substitution firms that influenced to some degree, and slowed down the rate of liberalization of unilateral trade barriers. In addition, the unilateral trade liberalization was facilitated by the weak role of the formal labor force and liberal-oriented consumer interest groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Tello Pacheco, 2022. "The Political Economy of Trade Barriers in Peru," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(74), pages 71-107, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000152:020722
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13961
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krugman, Paul R, 1987. "Is Free Trade Passe?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 131-144, Fall.
    2. Helpman, E., 1995. "Politics and Trade Policy," Papers 30-95, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    3. Brock, William A & Magee, Stephen P, 1978. "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 246-250, May.
    4. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-1187, December.
    5. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, January.
    6. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-160, February.
    7. Krugman, Paul R., 1989. "Industrial organization and international trade," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 20, pages 1179-1223, Elsevier.
    8. Smith, Richard J & Blundell, Richard W, 1986. "An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 679-685, May.
    9. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 856-866, December.
    10. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    11. Mario D. Tello, 2013. "Mediciones del cambio estructural en el Perú: un análisis regional, 2002-2011," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2013-364, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
    12. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    13. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    14. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494, Elsevier.
    15. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    16. Sam Laird & Alexander Yeats, 1990. "Quantitative Methods for Trade-Barrier Analysis," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-11141-1.
    17. Krugman, Paul R, 1993. "The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 362-366, May.
    18. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, 1998. "The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile," NBER Working Papers 6510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Ludema, Rodney D. & Mayda, Anna Maria & Yu, Zhi & Yu, Miaojie, 2021. "The political economy of protection in GVCs: Evidence from Chinese micro data," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    20. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2019. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(2), pages 127-143, June.
    21. Mustapha Nabli, 1990. "The political economy of trade liberalization in developing countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 111-145, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    2. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
    3. Christis G. Tombazos, 2003. "Unprotective Tariffs, Ineffective Liberalization, and Other Mysteries: An Investigation of the Endogenous Dimensions of Trade Policy Formation in Australia," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(1), pages 49-74, July.
    4. Olper, Alessandro, 2017. "The political economy of trade-related regulatory policy: environment and global value chain," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 5(3), February.
    5. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August.
    6. Yasar, Mahmut, 2013. "Political Influence of Exporting and Import-Competing Firms: Evidence from Eastern European and Central Asian Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 154-168.
    7. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    8. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    9. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2003. "Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy: An Interest-Group Approach," NBER Working Papers 9631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Theo S Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2000. "Politics and Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation"," Working Papers 0004, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    11. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
    12. Pokrivcak, Jan, 2007. "Economics and Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements," Working Papers 7286, TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements.
    13. Chang, Pao-Li, 2005. "Protection for sale under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 509-526, July.
    14. Mr. Qing Wang, 2001. "Import-Reducing Effect of Trade Barriers: A Cross-Country Investigation," IMF Working Papers 2001/216, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February.
    16. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 4, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, 2000. "Trade Barriers And Trade Flows Across Countries And Industries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(3), pages 372-382, August.
    18. Enrico Marvasi, 2013. "Protection for Sale, Monopolistic Competition and Variable Markups," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_11.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    19. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    20. Wang, Xiaosong & Li, Kunwang & Xie, Shenxiang & Hou, Jack, 2013. "How is U.S. trade policy towards China determined?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 25-36.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tariffs; non-tariff barriers; political economy; Ministry of Economy and Finance; Peru.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000152:020722. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Luis Eudoro Vallejo Zamudio (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/index .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.