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Rationality, preferences and irregular war

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  • Boris Salazar

    ()

  • María del Pilar Castillo

    ()

Abstract

We suppose that civilians under threat prefer certain situations within a context of irregular war and endangered survival; they will prefer those situations associated with greater probabilities of survival. Using lexicographical preferences and belief systems, we have shown that civilians will choose not to remain in situations having a lower probability of survival. Linking into social networks allows for shorter deliberation processes, lower decision costs and faster convergence towards collective decision-making. Civilian displacement thus becomes the outcome of a rational decision-making procedure.

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File URL: http://www.fce.unal.edu.co/cej/number1/1-BORIS.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by UN - RCE - CID in its journal COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL.

Volume (Year): (2003)
Issue (Month): ()
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Handle: RePEc:col:000096:003415

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Keywords: Survival;

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  1. W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1997. "Commonp-Belief: The General Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-82, January.
  3. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 2000. "Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 1-16, January.
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, . ""Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 96-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  5. Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
  6. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0113, Econometric Society.
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Cited by:
  1. Alexander Cotte Poveda, 2012. "Empirical research on the relationship between violence and social development in Colombia," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(2), pages 37-56, November.

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