IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/clh/briefi/v11y2018i30.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Pros and Cons of Carbon Taxes and Cap-and-Trade Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Joel Wood

    (Thompson Rivers University)

Abstract

As part of Canada's effort to meet its commitment to the 2015 Paris climate accord, the provinces must establish their own carbon pricing policies or the federal government will impose a policy on them. When choosing among the various policies, provincial governments should first determine how much a particular policy will negatively affect economic competitiveness in their jurisdictions. When the negative impacts are judged to be low, a carbon tax on each tonne of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) is the preferred choice. A cap-and-trade policy allocating tradable permits under a market price, or a hybrid combination of carbon tax and cap-and-trade, is best when the negative impacts could be high. These three policies can all satisfactorily achieve emissions reductions. However, other variables must be taken into consideration, including the provision of price certainty, how strongly each policy promotes innovative research into cleaner technologies, the complexity and costs of set-up, the policy’s salience, or visibility to consumers, and the amount of revenue it can raise. A carbon tax has a major advantage over cap-and-trade and a hybrid version because it allows for carbon price certainty, is less costly to administer and is a substantial source of revenue. However, a cap-and-trade policy offers its own advantages in that emissions allowances can be allocated so as to minimize the policy’s negative effects on competitiveness and prevent emissions leakage. The latter is the term used when companies leave one jurisdiction to operate in another jurisdiction that has either fewer or no rules around carbon pricing. A hybrid policy, also known as output-based pricing, allows for some permits to be allocated freely based on a facility’s or industrial sector’s emissions and output. It also offers more carbon price certainty than a pure cap-and-trade system. Research shows that a hybrid policy almost completely reduces the impacts on competitiveness and emissions leakage. And while a carbon tax is more visible to the public, the advantages of higher visibility are debatable. Such a policy may be favourable because a lower price is required to achieve the same GHG reductions, but it might also be unfavourable because politically it is less palatable. British Columbia has a carbon tax, while Quebec uses a cap-and-trade system. Alberta has a hybrid policy that covers large industrial emitters and a carbon tax for smaller ones. Other provinces remain without a carbon pricing regime, while Ontario’s newly elected Progressive Conservative government is set to dismantle the province’s cap-and-trade policy. Those provinces that wait for the federal government to impose carbon pricing on them can expect to get a hybrid policy much like Alberta’s. For provincial governments wishing to establish their own policies, choosing one that is the right fit involves weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Ultimately, a given jurisdiction should examine its own economic and emissions profile in order to make the best choice for achieving the combined goal of reducing GHGs without negatively impinging on industry’s competitiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Joel Wood, 2018. "The Pros and Cons of Carbon Taxes and Cap-and-Trade Systems," SPP Briefing Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 11(30), November.
  • Handle: RePEc:clh:briefi:v:11:y:2018:i:30
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Carbon-Pricing-Wood.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Beck, Marisa & Rivers, Nicholas & Wigle, Randall & Yonezawa, Hidemichi, 2015. "Carbon tax and revenue recycling: Impacts on households in British Columbia," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 40-69.
    2. De Cara, Stéphane & Henry, Loïc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2018. "Optimal coverage of an emission tax in the presence of monitoring, reporting, and verification costs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 71-93.
    3. Holland, Stephen P., 2012. "Emissions taxes versus intensity standards: Second-best environmental policies with incomplete regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 375-387.
    4. Sarah Dobson & Jennifer Winter & Brendan Boyd, 2019. "The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Coverage of Carbon Pricing Instruments for Canadian Provinces," SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 12(6), February.
    5. Rivers, Nic & Jaccard, Mark, 2006. "Choice of environmental policy in the presence of learning by doing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 223-242, March.
    6. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2011. "Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 11, pages 29-53, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. James Bushnell & Carla Peterman & Catherine Wolfram, 2008. "Local Solutions to Global Problems: Climate Change Policies and Regulatory Jurisdiction," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 175-193, Summer.
    8. Chad Lawley and Vincent Thivierge, 2018. "Refining the evidence: British Columbias carbon tax and household gasoline consumption," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    9. Yamazaki, Akio, 2017. "Jobs and climate policy: Evidence from British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 197-216.
    10. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
    11. Robert W. Hahn, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(4), pages 753-765.
    12. Tsvetanov, Tsvetan & Segerson, Kathleen, 2013. "Re-evaluating the role of energy efficiency standards: A behavioral economics approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 347-363.
    13. Fischer, Carolyn & Newell, Richard G., 2008. "Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 142-162, March.
    14. Ross McKitrick, 2016. "A Practical Guide to the Economics of Carbon Pricing," SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 9(28), September.
    15. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
    16. Can Erutku & Vincent Hildebrand, 2018. "Carbon Tax at the Pump in British Columbia and Quebec," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 44(2), pages 126-133, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mehdi Fadaee & Luca Lambertini, 2015. "Non-tradeable pollution permits as green R&D incentives," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(1), pages 27-42, January.
    2. Stephen P. Holland & Jonathan E. Hughes & Christopher R. Knittel & Nathan C. Parker, 2013. "Unintended Consequences of Transportation Carbon Policies: Land-Use, Emissions, and Innovation," NBER Working Papers 19636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ben Youssef, Slim & Dinar, Zeineb, 2009. "Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale [Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D]," MPRA Paper 22385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2010.
    4. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W. H. Parry, 2008. "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 152-174, Summer.
    5. Robert N. Stavins, 2011. "The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 81-108, February.
    6. Newell, Richard G & Stavins, Robert N, 2003. "Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-59, January.
    7. Jay S. Coggins & Andrew L. Goodkind & Jason Nguyen & Zhiyu Wang, 2019. "Price Effects, Inefficient Environmental Policy, and Windfall Profits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(3), pages 637-656, March.
    8. Lade, Gabriel E. & Lin Lawell, C.-Y. Cynthia, 2015. "The design and economics of low carbon fuel standards," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 91-99.
    9. Stavins, Robert N., 2019. "The Future of U.S. Carbon-Pricing Policy: Normative Assessment and Positive Prognosis," Working Paper Series rwp19-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Ben Youssef, Slim & Zaccour, Georges, 2014. "Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R&D Subsidies," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 41-58, April.
    11. Shoji Haruna & Rajeev K. Goel, 2019. "Optimal pollution control in a mixed oligopoly with research spillovers," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 21-40, March.
    12. Dagmar Nelissen & Till Requate, 2007. "Pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological progress," International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1), pages 5-44.
    13. Alejandro Caparrós & Richard E. Just & David Zilberman, 2015. "Dynamic Relative Standards versus Emission Taxes in a Putty-Clay Model," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 277-308.
    14. Stavins, Robert & Newell, Richard, 2000. "Abatement-Cost Heterogeneity and Anticipated Savings from Market-Based Environmental Policies," Working Paper Series rwp00-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    15. Requate, Till, 2005. "Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments--a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 175-195, August.
    16. Joseph E. Aldy & Alan J. Krupnick & Richard G. Newell & Ian W. H. Parry & William A. Pizer, 2010. "Designing Climate Mitigation Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 903-934, December.
    17. Bernard, Jean-Thomas & Kichian, Maral, 2019. "The long and short run effects of British Columbia's carbon tax on diesel demand," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 380-389.
    18. Stavins, Robert, 2019. "The Future of United States Carbon-Pricing Policy," RFF Working Paper Series 19-11, Resources for the Future.
    19. Francisco J. André and Carmen Arguedas, 2018. "Technology Adoption in Emission Trading Programs with Market Power," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I).
    20. Li, Shoude, 2013. "Emission permit banking, pollution abatement and production–inventory control of the firm," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 679-685.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:clh:briefi:v:11:y:2018:i:30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bev Dahlby (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/spcalca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.