Sorting by foot: `travel-for' local public goods and equilibrium stratification
AbstractWe re-examine Tiebout's hypothesis of endogenous sorting in a competitive spatial equilibrium framework, by considering both income and preference heterogeneity and by allowing agents to decide endogenously the number of visits to a `travel-for' local public good. The equilibrium configuration may be completely segregated, incompletely segregated, or completely integrated, depending on relative market rents and income-preference-local tax parameters. A segregated equilibrium may feature endogenous sorting purely by income or by both income and preferences. While the rich need not be closer to the local public facility site, multiple equilibria may arise when the equilibrium configuration is incompletely segregated.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- Berliant, Marcus & Peng, Shin-Kun & Wang, Ping, 2013. "Taxing Pollution: Agglomeration and Welfare Consequences," MPRA Paper 45520, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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