Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization?
AbstractThis survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal. Cet article prÃ©sente dans un cadre unifiÃ© un survol de trois thÃ©ories de la dÃ©centralisation de la prise de dÃ©cision dans les organisations. Ces thÃ©ories reposent sur la prÃ©sence d'information privÃ©e et des incitations qui en dÃ©coulent. La renÃ©gociation, la collusion et les limites Ã la communication reprÃ©sentent trois conditions suffisantes pouvant expliquer l'optimalitÃ© de la dÃ©centralisation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Other versions of this item:
- Michel Poitevin, 2000. "Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-32, CIRANO.
- Poitevin, M., 2000. "Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-13, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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