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Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization?

Author

Listed:
  • Poitevin, M.

Abstract

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Poitevin, M., 2000. "Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-13, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    2. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
    3. Benoit A. Aubert & Michel Patry & Suzanne Rivard & Heather Smith, 2000. "IT Outsourcing Risk Management at British Petroleum," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-31, CIRANO.
    4. Marcel Boyer, 1999. "Les Expos, l'OSM, les universités, les hôpitaux : Le coût d'un déficit de 400 000 emplois au Québec = Expos, Montreal Symphony Orchestra, Universities, Hospitals: The Cost of a 400,000-Job Shortfall i," CIRANO Papers 99c-01, CIRANO.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. GRECO, Luciano, 2003. "Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution," CORE Discussion Papers 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Nobuo Akai & Masayo Hosoi & Yukihiro Nishimura, 2009. "Fiscal Decentralization And Economic Volatility: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section Data Of The Usa," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 223-235.
    3. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2015. "Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 109-149, November.
    4. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
    5. Pérez, Jessica Helen & Iranzo Sancho, Susana, 2012. "Determinants of Decentralization within the Firm: Some Empirical Evidence from Spanish Small and Medium- Sized Enterprise," Working Papers 2072/211755, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    6. Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 3117, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    8. Stefan Ambec, 2003. "A Theory of Authority in Bilateral Contracting," CSEF Working Papers 102, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    9. Morasch, Karl, 2003. "Deciding about (de-)centralization of industrial policy: Delegation by a central authority vs. bargaining of regional governments," Working Papers in Economics 2003,3, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    10. Dilip Mookherjee, 2006. "Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 367-390, June.
    11. Andreas Roider, 2009. "Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 193-209, June.
    12. Canton, Joan & De Cara, Stéphane & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2009. "Agri-environmental schemes: Adverse selection, information structure and delegation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2114-2121, May.
    13. Theilen, Bernd, 2009. "Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring," Working Papers 2072/42863, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    14. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 391-411, September.
    15. Kei Kawakami, 2016. "Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 893-931, November.
    16. Timothy Van Zandt, 2008. "The Interplay Between Incentives and Communication Complexity in Mechanism Design," 2008 Meeting Papers 480, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Theilen Bernd, 2009. "Monitoring Gains and Decentralization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-26, September.
    18. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
    19. Jelovac, Izabela & Macho-Stadler, Ines, 2002. "Comparing organizational structures in health services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 501-522, December.
    20. Dilip Mookherjee, 2008. "The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Mechanism Design Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 237-260, June.
    21. AMBEC Stefan & POITEVIN Michel, 2008. "Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ?," LERNA Working Papers 08.22.266, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    22. Enis Kayis & Feryal Erhun & Erica L. Plambeck, 2013. "Delegation vs. Control of Component Procurement Under Asymmetric Cost Information and Simple Contracts," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 45-56, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION ; DECENTRALIZATION ; DECISION MAKING;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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