Anomalies de la théorie des préférences. Une interprétation et une proposition de formalisation
AbstractBased on experimental evidence, it is often said that one should give up the concept of preference. In this paper, we show that the validity of this inference relies on an implicit assumption, the invariance principle (ip), according to which certain features of the objects of choice are irrelevant to the decision to be made. This assumption is usually confounded with a necessary assumption of any economic model, the faithfulness assumption, (f), which states that the language of the model is rich enough to describe the diversity of empirical observations. In order to clarify the situation, we claim that one must disentangle (f) and (ip). We show that this can be done thanks to the structure of decision problem with normative equivalence (dpne) that we introduce. We study the decision process associated to it and show that it involves the salience of attributes as the decisive element.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 56 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pommerehne, Werner W & Schneider, Friedrich & Zweifel, Peter, 1982. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: A Reexamination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 569-74, June.
- Tversky, Amos & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Anomalies: Preference Reversals," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 201-11, Spring.
- Marc Le Menestrel & Luk Van Wassenhove, 2001.
"The Domain and Interpretation of Utility Functions: An Exploration,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 329-349, December.
- Marc Le Menestrel & Luk N. Van Wassenhove, 2001. "The domain and interpretation of utility functions: An exploration," Economics Working Papers 576, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 751-85, July.
- Machina, Mark J, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency and Non-expected Utility Models of Choice under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1622-68, December.
- Baigent, Nick & Gaertner, Wulf, 1996.
"Never Choose the Uniquely Largest: A Characterization,"
Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 239-49, August.
- Nick Baigent & Wulf Gaertner, 1996. "Never choose the uniquely largest A Characterization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 239-249.
- Slovic, Paul & Lichtenstein, Sarah, 1983. "Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 596-605, September.
- Matthew Rabin, 1998.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
- Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Economics Working Papers 97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8jd5z5j2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Fishburn, Peter C, 1991. " Nontransitive Preferences in Decision Theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 113-34, April.
- Loomes, Graham & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Preference Reversal: Information-Processing Effect or Rational Non-transitive Choice?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(395), pages 140-51, Supplemen.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 61-86, July.
- Levin, Irwin P. & Schneider, Sandra L. & Gaeth, Gary J., 1998. "All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 149-188, November.
- Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1979.
"Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 623-38, September.
- Grether, David M. & Plott, Charles R., . "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon," Working Papers 152, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Loomes, Graham & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 425-39, March.
- Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
- Segal, Uzi, 1988. "Does the Preference Reversal Phenomenon Necessarily Contradict the Independence Axiom?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 233-36, March.
- Lipman, Barton L, 1999. "Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 339-61, April.
- Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July.
- Mandler, Michael, 2005. "Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 255-277, February.
- Tversky, Amos & Slovic, Paul & Kahneman, Daniel, 1990. "The Causes of Preference Reversal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 204-17, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.