IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/ajlecn/v1y2010i1n2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Environmental Citizen Suits with Pigovian Punitive Damages

Author

Listed:
  • Park Sung-Hoon

    (Gyeonggi Research Institute)

  • Shogren Jason F

    (University of Wyoming)

Abstract

Federal environmental laws encourage private citizens to act like "private attorney generals" and to sue a firm. This citizen group competes over the rewards of levels of regulation and enforcement. The firm can reduce its output to curtail the likelihood of losing the contest. This paper explores whether one can combine citizen suits with Pigovian punitive damages to equate private and social incentives. We show: (i) without punitive damages, the level of output of the firm is only optimal in a special case; (ii) with punitive damages given to the citizen group, Pigovian punitive damages can be found, but it could be negative-the citizen group might have to compensate the firm; (iii) the ideal level of punitive damages can be achieved if a government takes it; and (iv) punitive damages which are taken by the citizen group induces more effort expended in the conflict relative to when the government receives the punitive damages.

Suggested Citation

  • Park Sung-Hoon & Shogren Jason F, 2010. "Environmental Citizen Suits with Pigovian Punitive Damages," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:1:y:2010:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/2154-4611.1001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/2154-4611.1001
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/2154-4611.1001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
    2. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 43-50, August.
    3. Baik Kyung Hwan & Shogren Jason F., 1994. "Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement for Citizen Suits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-20, July.
    4. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
    5. Katz, Avery, 1988. "Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 127-143, December.
    6. Peter Diamond, 2002. "Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 117-139, April.
    7. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.
    8. Heyes, Anthony G., 1997. "Environmental Regulation by Private Contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 407-428, February.
    9. Anthony Heyes (ed.), 2001. "The Law and Economics of the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2037.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lim, Byung In & Shogren, Jason F., 2005. "Valuation by conflict," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-261, November.
    2. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Asymmetric information contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 645-665, November.
    3. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    4. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
    5. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
    6. Kyung Hwan Baik & In‐Gyu Kim, 2007. "Strategic Decisions On Lawyers’ Compensation In Civil Disputes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 854-863, October.
    7. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "An investment contest to influence environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 300-324, November.
    8. Sung-Hoon Park & Chad Settle, 2022. "Internalizing environmental damages and endogenous reimbursement in environmental conflicts: a game-theoretic analysis," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 69(4), pages 547-569, December.
    9. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1998. "Effort levels in a Cournot Nash contest with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 195-210, June.
    10. Eric Sjöberg, 2014. "Settlement under the threat of conflict-The cost of asymmetric information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2014_02, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    11. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
    12. Kyung Hwan Baik & Jong Hwa Lee, 2013. "Endogenous Timing In Contests With Delegation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2044-2055, October.
    13. Morakinyo O Adetutu & Kayode A Odusanya & Eleni Stathopoulou & Thomas G Weyman-Jones, 2023. "Environmental regulation, taxes, and activism," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 460-489.
    14. Chad Settle & Jason F. Shogren, 2001. "Environmental conflicts with SLAPP reputations," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 4(2), pages 129-139, September.
    15. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    16. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2007. "Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 768-776, September.
    17. Byung In Lim & Jason Shogren, 2004. "Unilateral delegation and reimbursement systems in an environmental conflict," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(8), pages 489-493.
    18. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    19. Morin Chassé, Rémi, 2019. "Strategic behavior in environmental contests with asymmetric ability and reimbursement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 115-126.
    20. Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2004. "Delegation in a group-contest," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 263-272, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:1:y:2010:i:1:n:2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.