Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others
AbstractJustifications for the use of punitive damages refer to deterrence and punishment. After formulating a social welfare function that incorporates both economic efficiency and a desire for retribution, optimal punitive damages are considered to balance concerns for economic efficiency and for retribution. This optimal balancing is considered where compensatory damages alone provide the correct level of deterrence, allowing the ideal retribution to vary with the level of wealth and with the level of precaution. The analysis is extended to situations where some accidents do not result in liability. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- Diamond, P.A., 1997. "Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others," Working papers 97-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability
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- Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005.
"The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
05-004, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Luciana Echazu & Mark Frascatore, 2012. "Supply Chain Quality, Mandatory Insurance, and Recall Risk," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-11, June.
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