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Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance

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  • Michelle L. Zorn
  • Christine Shropshire
  • John A. Martin
  • James G. Combs
  • David J. Ketchen Jr.

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  • Michelle L. Zorn & Christine Shropshire & John A. Martin & James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen Jr., 2017. "Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(13), pages 2623-2646, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:38:y:2017:i:13:p:2623-2646
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