IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v48y2013i03p669-698_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Mobbs, Shawn

Abstract

This study examines board monitoring when a credible chief executive officer (CEO) replacement is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance. These results reveal that certain insiders strengthen board monitoring by serving as a readily available CEO replacement and contradict the presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Furthermore, the results persist when accounting for the endogenous firm selection of talented inside directors.

Suggested Citation

  • Mobbs, Shawn, 2013. "CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 669-698, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:03:p:669-698_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109013000318/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:03:p:669-698_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jfq .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.