The effects of mergers on product positioning: evidence from the music radio industry
Abstract
This article shows that mergers between close competitors in the music radio industry lead to important changes in product positioning. Firms that buy competing stations tend to differentiate them and, consistent with the firm wanting to reduce audience cannibalization, their combined audience increases. However, the merging stations also become more like competitors, so that aggregate variety does not increase, and the gains in market share come at the expense of other stations in the same format. The results shed light on the effects of mergers and, more broadly, on how multiproduct firms may use product positioning as a competitive tool. Copyright (c) 2010, RAND.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 41 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 372-397
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Marco Antonielli & Lapo Filistrucchi, 2012.
"Collusion and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers,"
Working Papers Series
wp2012_07.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Economia e Dell'Impresa.
- Marco Antonielli & Lapo Filistrucchi, 2011. "Collusion and the political differentiation of newspapers," Working Papers 11-26, NET Institute, revised Nov 2011.
- Filistrucchi, L. & Antonielli, M., 2012. "Collusion and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers," Discussion Paper 2012-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Filistrucchi, L. & Antonielli, M., 2012. "Collusion and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers," Discussion Paper 2012-024, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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