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Leader Location, Cooperation, and Coordination in Serial Supply Chains

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  • Pranab Majumder
  • Ashok Srinivasan

Abstract

In this paper, we study multi‐stage serial supply chains with price dependent deterministic demand and increasing marginal costs. We analyze the effect of contract leadership (i.e., the ability to offer wholesale price and two‐part tariff contracts) on supply chain performance and use that as a basis to study coordination and cooperation. There is strong evidence of first‐mover advantage in wholesale price contracting which is amplified when the chain is coordinated using two‐part tariff contracts We analyze cooperation and the implications of leader location in uncoordinated chains Our results demonstrate the importance of considering the entire sequence of successive contracts when assessing the performance of a supply chain. We find that in some cases an inefficient supply chain may have a natural tendency to reduce inefficiency through cooperation between non‐leader members

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  • Pranab Majumder & Ashok Srinivasan, 2006. "Leader Location, Cooperation, and Coordination in Serial Supply Chains," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 15(1), pages 22-39, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:22-39
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2006.tb00001.x
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kumoi, Yuki & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2014. "Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 221-232.
    3. Feimin Zhong & Jinxing Xie & Xiaobo Zhao & Zuo‐Jun Max Shen, 2016. "On efficiency of multistage channel with bargaining over wholesale prices," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(6), pages 449-459, September.
    4. Oliveira, Fernando S. & Ruiz, Carlos & Conejo, Antonio J., 2013. "Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 227(3), pages 527-537.
    5. Xiutian Shi & Yuan Qian & Ciwei Dong, 2017. "Economic and Environmental Performance of Fashion Supply Chain: The Joint Effect of Power Structure and Sustainable Investment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-22, June.
    6. Choi, Tsan-Ming & Li, Yongjian & Xu, Lei, 2013. "Channel leadership, performance and coordination in closed loop supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 371-380.
    7. Biswas, Indranil & Gupta, Rohit & Tiwari, Sunil & Talluri, Srinivas, 2023. "Multi-echelon supply chain coordination: Contract sequence and cut-off policies," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 259(C).
    8. Housheng Duan & Jiayan Xu, 2023. "Remanufacturing and Product Recovery Strategies Considering Chain-to-Chain Competition and Power Structures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(10), pages 1-26, May.
    9. Xuyue Li, 2018. "Competing Retailers’ Environmental Investment: An Analysis under Different Power Structures," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-18, October.
    10. Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh & Maryam Johari & Mohammadreza Nematollahi & Parvin Pazari, 2023. "Reverse supply chain management with dual channel and collection disruptions: supply chain coordination and game theory approaches," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 324(1), pages 215-248, May.

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