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Technology Transfer In A Stackelberg Structure: Licensing Contracts And Welfare

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  • TARUN KABIRAJ

Abstract

We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether a leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than a follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when a follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2005.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Manchester in its journal The Manchester School.

Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 1-28

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Handle: RePEc:bla:manchs:v:73:y:2005:i:1:p:1-28

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Cited by:
  1. Arijit Mukherjee & Yingyi Tsai, 2013. "Technology licensing under optimal tax policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 231-247, April.
  2. Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2002. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Department of Economics Working Papers 02-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  3. Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "On the coexistence of different licensing schemes," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 393-413.
  4. Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "Fee versus royalty reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 141-147, October.
  5. Changying Li & Junmei Wang, 2010. "Licensing a Vertical Product Innovation," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(275), pages 517-527, December.
  6. Marjit, Sugata & Beladi, Hamid & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2007. "Brand name collaboration and optimal tariff," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 636-647, July.
  7. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 735-742, August.
  8. Li, Changying & Ji, Xiaoming, 2010. "Innovation, licensing, and price vs. quantity competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 746-754, May.
  9. Li, Changying & Geng, Xiaoyan, 2008. "Licensing to a durable-good monopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 876-884, September.
  10. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2014. "Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 455-465.
  11. BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & D’ASPREMONT, Claude & GURIEV, Sergei & SEN, Debapriya, 2012. "Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting," CORE Discussion Papers 2012055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Arijit Mukherjee, . "Technology licensing under convex costs," Discussion Papers 10/05, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  13. Yair Tauman & Debrapiya Sen, 2012. "Patents and Licenses," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  14. Weifang Lou, 2009. "Estimating the Impact of a Potential Process Innovation and the Optimal Strategy of Licensing," Working Papers 2009.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  15. Li, Changying & Song, Juan, 2009. "Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 183-190, March.

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