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Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer–Shepsle versus Stackelberg

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  • PHILIPPE DE DONDER
  • MICHEL LE BRETON
  • EUGENIO PELUSO

Abstract

We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously specified sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the importance of single crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose definition involves both policy dimensions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 14 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 879-909

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:14:y:2012:i:6:p:879-909

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Russo, Antonio, 2012. "Voting on Road Congestion Policy," TSE Working Papers 12-310, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2012.
  2. Alberto F. Alesina & Francesco Passarelli, 2010. "Regulation Versus Taxation," NBER Working Papers 16413, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Donato Masciandaro, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Financial Systemic Risk: Taxation or Regulation?," ISLA Working Papers 41, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  4. Kirill Borissov & Joseph Hanna & Stephane Lambrecht, 2014. "Public Goods, Voting, and Growth," EUSP Deparment of Economics Working Paper Series Ec-01/14, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
  5. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2009. "On the (Sequential) Majority Choice of Public Good Size and Location," CEPR Discussion Papers 7223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & and Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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