Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?

Contents:

Author Info

  • CRAIG DOIDGE
  • G. ANDREW KAROLYI
  • RENÉ M. STULZ
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms' insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock-price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock-price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h-6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally. Copyright (c) 2010 The American Finance Association.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01577.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 65 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (08)
    Pages: 1507-1553

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:4:p:1507-1553

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.afajof.org/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Daugherty, Mary & Georgieva, Dobrina, 2011. "Foreign cultures, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and cross-delisting," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 208-223, October.
    2. repec:dgr:uvatin:2010129 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Korczak, Adriana & Korczak, Piotr, 2013. "The development of emerging stock markets and the demand for cross-listing," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 63-77.
    4. Brian Lucey & Colm KEarney & Ciaran MacAnBhaird, 2012. "Culture and capital structure in small and medium sized firms," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp419, IIIS.
    5. Peng, Mike W. & Su, Weichieh, 2014. "Cross-listing and the scope of the firm," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 42-50.
    6. Thierry Foucault & Laurent Frésard, 2012. "Cross-Listing, Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, and the Learning Hypothesis," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(11), pages 3305-3350.
    7. Chaplinsky, Susan & Ramchand, Latha, 2012. "What drives delistings of foreign firms from U.S. Exchanges?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 1126-1148.
    8. Nielsson, Ulf, 2013. "Do less regulated markets attract lower quality firms? Evidence from the London AIM market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 335-352.
    9. Martina Vitézová, 2011. "Market Perception of SOX Act in the Case of US Listed Banks," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 155-170.
    10. Knoeber, Charles R. & Walker, Mark D., 2013. "The effect of tougher enforcement on foreign firms: Evidence from the Adelphia perp walk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 382-394.
    11. Cosset, Jean-Claude & Meknassi, Siham, 2013. "Does cross-listing in the US foster mergers and acquisitions and increase target shareholder wealth?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 54-73.
    12. Karolyi, G. Andrew, 2012. "Corporate governance, agency problems and international cross-listings: A defense of the bonding hypothesis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 516-547.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:4:p:1507-1553. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.