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The Creation of A Middle‐Management Level by Entrepreneurial Ventures: Testing Economic Theories of Organizational Design

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  • Massimo G. Colombo
  • Luca Grilli

Abstract

Why do some entrepreneurial ventures rapidly switch from flat organizations composed of owner‐managers and line workers to deeper organizations that also include a middle‐management level? The aim of this paper is to investigate this issue and to test the predictions of different streams of the theoretical economic literature on organizational design. We use the estimates of survival data analysis models to examine the determinants of the addition of a middle‐management level to the corporate hierarchy of a large sample of Italian high‐tech entrepreneurial ventures. The econometric results lend support to the view proposed by the “information processing” stream that the information overload problems engendered by a highly competitive and unpredictable business environment are key drivers of the creation of a middle‐management level. Moreover, in accordance with the “knowledge hierarchy” literature, the greater the human capital of firms’ owner‐managers, the more likely the appointment of a middle manager. Conversely, we fail to provide evidence consistent with theoretical predictions inspired by the “decentralization of incentives” stream. Lastly, transaction costs and adverse selection problems in the managerial labour market are found to have a large negative effect on the likelihood of the appointment of middle managers.

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  • Massimo G. Colombo & Luca Grilli, 2013. "The Creation of A Middle‐Management Level by Entrepreneurial Ventures: Testing Economic Theories of Organizational Design," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 390-422, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:390-422
    DOI: 10.1111/gems.2013.22.issue-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Grimpe, Christoph & Murmann, Martin & Sofka, Wolfgang, 2017. "The organizational design of high-tech startups and product innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-074, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Bertoni, Fabio & Colombo, Massimo G. & Grilli, Luca, 2011. "Venture capital financing and the growth of high-tech start-ups: Disentangling treatment from selection effects," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1028-1043, September.
    3. Colombo, Massimo G. & Piva, Evila, 2020. "Start-ups launched by recent STEM university graduates: The impact of university education on entrepreneurial entry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(6).
    4. Louise Lindbjerg & Theodor Vladasel, 2021. "Hiring Entrepreneurs for Innovation," Working Papers 1309, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Paola Rovelli & Vincenzo Butticè, 2020. "On the organizational design of entrepreneurial ventures: the configurations of the entrepreneurial team," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(2), pages 243-269, June.
    6. Massimo Colombo & Annalisa Croce & Samuele Murtinu, 2014. "Ownership structure, horizontal agency costs and the performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 265-282, February.
    7. Andreas P. Distel & Wolfgang Sofka & Pedro de Faria & Miguel Torres Preto & António Sérgio Ribeiro, 2022. "Dynamic capabilities for hire – How former host-country entrepreneurs as MNC subsidiary managers affect performance," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(4), pages 657-688, June.
    8. Massimo G. Colombo & Massimiliano Guerini & Cristina Rossi-Lamastra & Andrea Bonaccorsi, 2022. "The “first match” between high-tech entrepreneurial ventures and universities: the role of founders’ social ties," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 270-306, February.
    9. Saerom (Ronnie) Lee, 2022. "The myth of the flat start‐up: Reconsidering the organizational structure of start‐ups," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 58-92, January.
    10. Massimo G. Colombo & Samuele Murtinu, 2017. "Venture Capital Investments in Europe and Portfolio Firms' Economic Performance: Independent Versus Corporate Investors," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 35-66, February.
    11. Stefano Colombo & Luca Grilli, 2017. "Should I stay or should I go? Founder’s decision to leave an entrepreneurial venture during an industrial crisis," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(2), pages 97-121, February.
    12. Alex Coad, 2022. "Lumps, Bumps and Jumps in the Firm Growth Process," Foundations and Trends(R) in Entrepreneurship, now publishers, vol. 18(4), pages 212-267, April.
    13. Hensellek, Simon & Kleine-Stegemann, Lucas & Kollmann, Tobias, 2023. "Entrepreneurial leadership, strategic flexibility, and venture performance: Does founders' span of control matter?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    14. Samuele Murtinu, 2015. "Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2610-2616.

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