Threats Or Promises? A Built-In Mechanism Of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization
AbstractWe analyze an infinitely repeated tariff-setting game played by two large countries with alternating moves. We focus on the subgame perfect equilibria in which each country chooses its tariff according to a stationary function of the other country's tariff. We show that there are many equilibria with two steady states, one with higher tariffs (but still lower than the static Nash tariffs), the other with lower tariffs. We also show that there is a special class of equilibria in which there exists a unique, globally stable steady state. In both types of equilibria, one country unilaterally reduces its tariff from the static Nash equilibrium, the other country reciprocates in response to the first country's implicit "promise" to lower its tariff even further, and this process continues forever, converging to a steady state with tariffs lower than the static Nash tariffs. Therefore, promises, rather than threats, induce countries to gradually reduce their tariffs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Japanese Economic Association in its journal Japanese Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 63 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1352-4739
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Taiji Furusawa & Takashi Kamihigashi, 2011. "Threats or Promises? A Built-in Mechanism of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper Series DP2011-27, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Jan 2012.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric W. Bond & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2002.
"Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 379-406.
- Bond, Eric W & Park, Jee-Hyeong, 2002. "Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 379-406, April.
- Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), 2002. "Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in Freeing Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025213, December.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010.
"Global Dynamics in Repeated Games with Additively Separable Payoffs,"
Discussion Paper Series
DP2010-04, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Jun 2010.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010. "Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 899-918, October.
- Krishna, Pravin & Mitra, Devashish, 2005. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 461-487, March.
- Furusawa, Taiji & Lai, Edwin L. -C., 1999. "Adjustment costs and gradual trade liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 333-361, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.