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Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games: Some New Results

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Author Info
Jean-Pierre Ponssard ()

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Abstract

Two-player infinitely-repeated-entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent facing a hit and run entrant. Rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with previous approaches are analyzed. Several economic illustrations are discussed.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1186.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1186.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1186

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Related research
Keywords: rent dissipation Markov equilibria hit and run

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "How effective is potential competition?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 67-70. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. J. Tirole & E. Maskin, 1982. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs," Working papers 320, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
  5. Gromb, Denis & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre & Sevy, David, 1997. "Selection in Dynamic Entry Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 62-84, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre & Sevy, David, 1996. "Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 213-221, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Wilson, Robert, 1992. "Strategic models of entry deterrence," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 305-329 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, 1991. "Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 221-236, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marcel Boyer & Pierre Lasserre & Thomas Mariotti & Michel Moreaux, 2001. "Preemption and Rent Dissipation under Bertrand Competition," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-04, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques. [Downloadable!]
  10. Geroski, P. A., 1995. "What do we know about entry?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 421-440, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Henk C. Kranendonk & Jan Bonenkamp & Johan P. Verbruggen, 2004. "A Leading Indicator for the Dutch Economy – Methodological and Empirical Revision of the CPB System," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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