Rent Dissipation in Repeated Entry Games: Some New Results
AbstractTwo-player infinitely-repeated-entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent facing a hit and run entrant. Rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with previous approaches are analyzed. Several economic illustrations are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1186.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
rent dissipation; Markov equilibria; hit and run;
Other versions of this item:
- Jean Pierre Ponssard, 2004. "Rent dissipation in repeated entry games: some new results," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000082, UCLA Department of Economics.
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-06-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENT-2004-08-31 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-MIC-2004-08-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2004-08-31 (Regulation)
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