Global Dynamics in Repeated Games with Additively Separable Payoffs
AbstractThis paper studies the global dynamics of a class of infinitely repeated two-player games in which the action space of each player is an interval, and the one-shot payoff of each player is additively separable in their actions. We define an immediately reactive equilibrium (IRE) as a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium such that each player's action is a stationary function of the opponent's last action. We completely characterize IREs and their dynamics in terms of certain indifference curves. Our results are used to show that in a prisoners' dilemma game with observable mixed strategies, gradual cooperation occurs when the players are sufficiently patient, and that in a certain duopoly game, kinked demand curves emerge naturally.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number DP2010-04.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision: Jun 2010
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Immediately reactive equilibria; Additively separable payoffs; Kinked demand; Gradual cooperation; Prisoners' dilemma;
Other versions of this item:
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010. "Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 899-918, October.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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Discussion Paper Series
DP2013-35, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Dec 2013.
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