Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly: Weighted Welfare And Price Competition
AbstractIn this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (wighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weigth given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also anlyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer suspluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Japanese Economic Association in its journal Japanese Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 62 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1352-4739
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Other versions of this item:
- Sedano Hoyuelos, Máximo & Bárcena Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition," IKERLANAK 2011-46, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
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