IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/indrel/v45y2014i4p348-367.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The dark side of solidarity: social norms and social relations in the aftermath of strikes

Author

Listed:
  • Kirsten Thommes
  • Agnes Akkerman
  • René Torenvlied
  • Marieke Born

Abstract

This paper studies how employees anticipate change in social relations after a strike in their organisation. We hypothesise that two group norms affect employees' fear that a strike deteriorates the social relations with their colleagues. We distinguish between two different norms associated with a collective action problem such as a strike. A ‘solidarity norm’ prescribes that workers should participate in collective protest when called for. A ‘free rider punishment norm’ describes whether and how violators of the solidarity norm should be treated. While the former itself theoretically does not impact intra-group social relations, the latter one does. We test our hypotheses on a data set of 468 Dutch union members. Adherence to the free rider punishment norm significantly increases a fear for deterioration of social relations with colleagues after a strike, while adherence to the solidarity norm does not. We also find a moderating effect of expected proportion of strikers. The results are discussed with reference to industrial relations theory and mobilisation theory, further probing into mechanisms that relate social norms to the (anticipated) costs of participation and the quality of social relations after a strike.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirsten Thommes & Agnes Akkerman & René Torenvlied & Marieke Born, 2014. "The dark side of solidarity: social norms and social relations in the aftermath of strikes," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 348-367, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:indrel:v:45:y:2014:i:4:p:348-367
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/irj.12063
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Alexandre Mas, 2008. "Labour Unrest and the Quality of Production: Evidence from the Construction Equipment Resale Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 229-258.
    3. Alan B. Krueger & Alexandre Mas, 2004. "Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations: Labor Strife and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Tires," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 253-289, April.
    4. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2009. "Are Good Industrial Relations Good for the Economy?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(3), pages 253-269, August.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Nature, Nature, vol. 422(6928), pages 137-140, March.
    6. Casari, Marco & Luini, Luigi, 2009. "Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 273-282, August.
    7. Gramm, Cynthia L & Schnell, John F, 1994. "Difficult Choices: Crossing the Picket Line during the 1987 National Football League Strike," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 41-73, January.
    8. Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 78-100, July.
    9. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira, 2009. "Are Good Industrial Relations Good for the Economy?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(3), pages 253-269, August.
    10. Finkel, Steven E. & Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1989. "Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 885-903, September.
    11. John A. McClendon & Brian Klaas, 1993. "Determinants of Strike-Related Militancy: An Analysis of a University Faculty Strike," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(3), pages 560-573, April.
    12. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maja Kutlaca & Martijn van Zomeren & Kai Epstude, 2020. "Friends or foes? How activists and non-activists perceive and evaluate each other," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    2. Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
    3. Agnes Akkerman, 2014. "Involuntary disputes: When competition for members forces smaller unions to strike," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(4), pages 446-474, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thommes, Kirsten & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes, 2015. "Behavioral spillovers from freeriding in multilevel interactions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 78-87.
    2. de Melo, Gioia & Piaggio, Matías, 2015. "The perils of peer punishment: Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 376-393.
    3. Akerlof, Robert & Ashraf, Anik & Macchiavello, Rocco & Rabbani, Atonu, 2020. "Layoffs and productivity at a Bangladeshi sweater factor," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1293, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Stefan Bauernschuster & Timo Hener & Helmut Rainer, 2017. "When Labor Disputes Bring Cities to a Standstill: The Impact of Public Transit Strikes on Traffic, Accidents, Air Pollution, and Health," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 1-37, February.
    5. Simon Halliday, 2011. "Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games," Working Papers 211, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    6. William Heller & K. Sieberg, 2008. "Functional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 399-413, June.
    7. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    8. Topi Miettinen & Olli Ropponen & Pekka Sääskilahti, 2020. "Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1535-1574, October.
    9. Martin Brown & Jan Schmitz & Christian Zehnder, 2023. "Moral Constraints, Social Norm Enforcement and Strategic Default in Weak and Strong Economic Conditions," Working Papers 23.03, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    10. Karl-Dieter Opp, 1994. "Repression and Revolutionary Action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 101-138, January.
    11. Francesco Bogliacino & Laura Jiménez & Gianluca Grimalda, 2015. "Consultative, Democracy and Trust," Documentos de Trabajo, Escuela de Economía 12696, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    12. Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, 2012. "Assuring Adequate Deterrence in Tort: A Public Good Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    13. Vyrastekova, Jana & Funaki, Yukihiko & Takeuchi, Ai, 2011. "Sanctioning as a social norm: Expectations of non-strategic sanctioning in a public goods game experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 919-928.
    14. Driscoll, John C. & Holden, Steinar, 2014. "Behavioral economics and macroeconomic models," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 133-147.
    15. Isaac Mbiti & Danila Serra, 2022. "Health workers’ behavior, patient reporting and reputational concerns: lab-in-the-field experimental evidence from Kenya," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 514-556, April.
    16. Kirsten Bregn, 2013. "Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 21-35, March.
    17. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    18. KAMEI Kenju, 2022. "Self-regulatory Resources and Institutional Formation: A first experimental test," Discussion papers 22084, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    19. Alexandre Mas, 2017. "Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(5), pages 1683-1721.
    20. Kakizawa, Hisanobu, 2017. "The value of punishment of free riders: A case study on the receiving fee system of the Japanese public broadcasting organization," 14th ITS Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Kyoto 2017: Mapping ICT into Transformation for the Next Information Society 168496, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:indrel:v:45:y:2014:i:4:p:348-367. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0019-8692 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.