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Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem

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  • DOUGLAS D. HECKATHORN

    (University of Missouri—Kansas City)

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the first- and second-order free-rider problems in collective sanction systems, with special emphasis on the relative robustness of cooperation in the first and second levels. The results indicate that second-order cooperation exhibits surprising robustness relative to first-order cooperation. The implication is that hypocrisy, though universally maligned, may play a crucial transitional role both in the emergence of collective action and in the continuity of collective action under adverse circumstances.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas D. Heckathorn, 1989. "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 78-100, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:78-100
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001001006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    2. Heckathorn, Douglas D & Maser, Steven M, 1987. "Bargaining and the," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 69-98, Spring.
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