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Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand

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Author Info
Lambertini, Luca

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Abstract

The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. When the number of firms is low, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability if demand is sufficiently convex. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude. As the number of firms tends to infinity, Cournot behaviour is preferable to Bertrand behaviour in order to stabilize collusion, independently of the characteristics of market demand. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Bulletin of Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 329-34
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Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:48:y:1996:i:4:p:329-34

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Deneckere, R., 1983. "Duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-42. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Majerus, David W., 1988. "Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-297. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chang, Myong-Hun, 1991. "The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 453-469, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hackner, Jonas, 1994. "Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 155-177, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rees, Ray, 1985. "Cheating in a Duopoly Supergame," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 387-400, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule, 1985. "Stable heterogeneous cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 451-467, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Non-Linear Marcket Demand and Capital Accumulation in A Differential Oligopoly Game," Working Papers 372, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  2. L. Lambertini & M. Trombetta, 1997. "May Delegation Affect Firms' Ability to Collude?," Working Papers 275, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  3. Posada, P., 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 556, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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