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A Comparative Study Of Allocation Of Decision‐Making Across Stakeholder Groups: The Case Of Personal Care Industries

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  • Avner Ben‐Ner
  • Ting Ren

Abstract

ABSTRACT**: The article compares the allocation of decision‐making across stakeholder groups in for‐profit, nonprofit and local government personal care facilities in one state in the United States. We analyze detailed survey data on nursing homes, childcare centers and group homes. We find that in comparison to nonprofit and government organizations, for‐profit firms delegate more decision‐making power to executives and owners, and less to their employees, consumers, families, boards of directors, and community representatives. The differences, although generally small, support the hypothesis that decision‐making is allocated to different groups in accord with the broad objectives of the organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Avner Ben‐Ner & Ting Ren, 2010. "A Comparative Study Of Allocation Of Decision‐Making Across Stakeholder Groups: The Case Of Personal Care Industries," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(4), pages 611-630, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:81:y:2010:i:4:p:611-630
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2010.00424.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolae Bibu & Mihai Lisetchi & Diana Sala, 2012. "Beyond The Obvious: Social Innovation In The Ngos Management," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 6(1), pages 1-8, November.

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