Contracting For Nonpoint-Source Pollution Abatement
AbstractThis study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Agricultural Economics Association in its journal Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 01 (July)
Environmental Economics and Policy;
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