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Groundwater Management Instruments in a Conjunctive Use System: Assessing the Impact on Farmers’ Income Using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)

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  • Lenouvel, Vincent
  • Montginoul, Marielle

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to compare the “relative” and the “absolute” impact on farmers’ income of several economic instruments which may be implemented to mitigate farmers' groundwater withdrawals in a multi-resource system. We conducted fine-tuned field work with farmers in order to understand the key factors of substitution between underground and surface water at the farm level. A mixed integer linear programming framework has been used to model fruit and vegetable production systems and to infer the impact of instruments on farmers` income. Assuming this impact will sharply influence the acceptability of the instruments by the agricultural sector, we demonstrate why farmers’ acceptance is of central concern for both the design and the implementation of an environmental policy. We further assessed the potential financial transfers that could be undertaken to increase acceptability. Our results echo scholars’ doubts about the capacity of taxes to manage irrigation water use. We suggest that a policy relying on a “well-priced” substitutable resource would be greatly favoured by farmers and potentially by policy makers, since it will sharply decrease the transaction costs arising from the implementation of the instrument. In diesem Beitrag werden verschiedene Instrumente verglichen, die man zur Verminderung der Grundwasserentnahme durch Landwirte implementieren kann. Absolute und relative Wirkungen der Instrumente auf das landwirtschaftliche Einkommen werden gegenübergestellt. Wir führen eine empirische Untersuchung durch, die in Feinabstimmung mit Landwirten im französischen Roussillon-Tal erfolgt. Ziel ist es, die zentralen Einflussfaktoren für die Substitution zwischen Grundwasser und Oberflächenwasser auf der Ebene landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe herauszuarbeiten. Um die Effekte der Instrumente auf die landwirtschaftlichen Einkommen abzuleiten, wird ein gemischtganzzahliger linearer Optimierungsansatz verwendet, mit dem die Produktionssysteme der Obst- und Gemüseproduktion modelliert werden. Die Einkommenswirkungen der Instrumente bestimmen deren Akzeptanz im Agrarsektor, und deshalb ist die Akzeptanz von zentraler Bedeutung für die Ausgestaltung und Implementierung des auszuwählenden umweltpolitischen Instruments. Außerdem werden mögliche finanzielle Transferleistungen analysiert, die zur Erhöhung der Akzeptanz bei Landwirten denkbar sind. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die Einschätzung anderer Autoren, wonach die Besteuerung des Grundwassers zur Beeinflussung der Bewässerungsnachfrage nur wenig geeignet sind. Wir empfehlen eine Politik, die auf eine gezielten Steuerung der Preise des substitutiven Gutes – Oberflächenwasser – baut. Diese Politik würde von Landwirten bevorzugt werden und möglicherweise auch von Politikern, weil sie die Transaktionskosten als Folge der Implementierung der Politik sehr stark senken würde.

Suggested Citation

  • Lenouvel, Vincent & Montginoul, Marielle, 2010. "Groundwater Management Instruments in a Conjunctive Use System: Assessing the Impact on Farmers’ Income Using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)," German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics, vol. 59(03), pages 1-15, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:gjagec:145291
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.145291
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    1. Buchholz, Matthias & Musshoff, Oliver, 2014. "The role of weather derivatives and portfolio effects in agricultural water management," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 34-44.

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